

The background of the cover is a faded, sepia-toned image of a Mesopotamian relief. It depicts a bearded man, likely a warrior or deity, seated on a horse. He is holding a long bow in his right hand and an arrow in his left. The horse is also depicted with a long mane and tail. The relief is carved into a stone surface, showing some texture and wear.

IRAQ:

AN ABBREVIATED COUNTRY STUDY

by

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Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

July 2002

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February 2002

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Preface

This pamphlet is written as the first of a series of studies intended to provide country specific information that might be of use to BCTP personnel as they consider potential CONOPS (contingency operations) mission training requirements. The effort is intended to bring information together from multiple sources that is both succinct and current. Each work will be held to under forty pages whenever possible. These short studies are not intended to be all-inclusive, but rather to provide an easy-to-use resource that delivers relevant, up to date information that is sufficient to set BCTP contingency training activities solidly within a meaningful regional context.

Comments and corrections will be greatly appreciated and should be passed to the author by mail to the BCTP CONOPS Coordinator, U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program, 400 Kearny Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, or via e-mail to reederw@leavenworth.army.mil

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INTRODUCTION

Iraq lies in a region rich in history and culture peopled by different ethnic groups with varied religious, cultural, and political foundations. The country has been under the brutal control of the ruthless totalitarian dictator, Saddam Hussein, since 1979. Hussein exercises terror throughout all levels of his government to ruthlessly quell even suspected disloyalty. In turn, the government itself is largely an assembly of agencies that wreak terror on the Iraqi people, at home and abroad. Moreover, Iraq, a known producer of weapons of mass destruction, threatens the stability not only of the region, but the whole world. The country also provides a safe haven for elements of some Islamic terrorist organizations, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service wields one terrorist organization itself, the Arab Liberation Front or Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), in pursuit of its own objectives against the Iraqi people and the neighboring country of Iran.

This conflict and terror is wrought upon a region that is no stranger to turbulence and oppression. Yet, the land has also been, through its history, a place of beauty, and magnificence, and great cultural and scientific achievement.

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SCALE 1:6,430,000
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection,
standard parallels 12°N and 38°N

- International boundary
- ★ National capital
- Province capital
- +—+—+— Railroad
- Expressway
- Road
- - - - - Track

Topographic Relief Map
From the CIA Atlas of the Middle East, 1993

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Political Map of Iraq
CIA (1966)

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THE PLACE:

Iraq is a nearly landlocked nation with only 36 miles of coastline near the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In that southeast region much of the land was filled with reed marshes. The government devastated many of these in an effort to destroy the power of opposition Shi'a Muslims who inhabit that region, and only remnants of those marshes remain. The land rises slowly to the northwest across vast tracks of desert, until lifting onto the slopes of mountains along the borders of Turkey and Iran, some of which are over 10,000 feet high.

The prominent rivers of the region are the historically renowned Tigris and Euphrates that run from their sources high in the mountains of Turkey, across Syria, and then onto the desert plain of Iraq before emptying into the Persian Gulf.

Temperatures range from danger levels of 120-degree sweltering heat in summer to below freezing in mid-winter. Like the National Training Center in the California high desert, temperatures can swing dramatically in any given twenty-four hour period. Of course conditions are cooler in the higher terrain in the northwest.¹

HISTORY:

Ancient

The lands that comprise the state of Iraq cradled some of the world's first civilizations and are rich in history and culture. They are also turbulent places that came to form a frontier region between powerful competing empires. The peoples inhabiting these lands are tribal, and they are ethnic, and they are religious - but they remain adept at working their best personal advantage from whatever group holds power over them at any given moment.

This region, known historically as Mesopotamia, flanks the broad valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In ancient times it saw the rise and fall of the kingdoms of Sumer, Babylonia, Akkad, and Assyria. Some of the world's oldest cities rose in the region. These included Ur, possibly the oldest city on earth, and birthplace of the prophet Abraham, the patriarch of both Judaism and Islam.²

The area fell to the expanding rule of the Persian Empire by 500 BC, and remained under the sometimes-violent oppression of the Iranians for nearly two centuries before being conquered by Alexander the Great of Macedonia. Alexander was received as a liberator and much from his Hellenic culture in northern Greece was introduced into the region. At the same time, Mesopotamian business, art, science, and literature was revived and civilization along the fertile Tigris and Euphrates valleys soared during this era. Life was further enriched during the subsequent brief but important rule of the Parthians, a people from the region now known as Turkmenistan. The Parthians not only encouraged existing social mores, but facilitated a flourishing of life in the region which induced migrations of neighboring peoples into the land. These included Armaeans from the northwest, Iranians from the east, and Arabs from the south. The region reached an economic and cultural pinnacle.³

However, Roman conquest followed in A.D. 98, and a period of oppression once again fell upon the land. After 227, the Roman legions were locked in bloody battles with expanding Sassanid Iranians. After the fall of Rome, the great Roman empire fractured, and rule in the east was exercised from Constantinople. This line of Roman authority became known as the Byzantine Empire and thenceforth carried on the warfare in old Mesopotamia. The Iranians eventually prevailed in that conflict, however, and subsequently reigned over the neglect and ultimate obliteration of most of what had been one of the world's earliest and greatest cultures. Conditions were then ripe for another conquest and the building of a new culture on the land. That conquest would come from a new imperial power, Arabs expanding their sphere with previously unknown unity and strength under the banner of Islam.⁴

Medieval

Most Mesopotamians had become Christian by the time of the Arab conquest in the seventh century. Their Iranian overlords were focused north and west against threats imposed by the Byzantine Empire that held sway over most of the eastern Mediterranean. The Iranian rulers were drained by years of battle against this ominous enemy. Therefore, the march of Islam into their realm from the south was swift through a series of fierce battles. The numerically superior Iranians were quickly defeated and Islamic rule was imposed across the land.

Over time, the power of the ruling caliphs* was consolidated, Arabic language spread and replaced Persian, intermarriage became common, and conversions to Islam took place.⁵

A rift occurred in the Muslim community in the middle of the seventh century, however, over who would rightfully succeed as the combined religious and temporal head of Islam. Successful transitions had followed three times since the death of Mohammed, but when Ali ibn Abu Talib was installed as the fourth in the young line of caliphs, there was trouble. Ali was accused of complicity in the murder of his predecessor, and bloody battles ensued in the region of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. The result was the split of Islam into two mutually antagonistic branches, Ahl-as-Sunna or Sunni ("Followers of Mohammed) and the Shiat Ali or Shi'a ("Party of Ali). Ali was assassinated in 661 and buried about eighty miles south of Baghdad at An Najaf. The Sunnis shifted their seat of power in the region to Damascus. The Shi'as found support in the area of the Tigris and Euphrates and in Iranian lands to the east. The Shi'as soon established their seat of power in the old Sassanid city of Baghdad, but shortly found themselves under the rule of a series of Sunni caliphs - however these particular Sunnis had come to the land from far to the northwest and were in militant opposition to those centered in Damascus. In Baghdad, under their enlightened Sunni rule, that became known as the Abbasid Caliphate, Arab and Iranian culture mixed and produced an Islamic scientific, literary, and philosophical zenith in the ninth century that has been unmatched in the history of the region since.⁶

However, strains developed between the Arab and Iranian populations, and there were pressures from Turkish peoples from the north. In time, the Turks gained power and ruled the land for much of the tenth through the early thirteenth centuries. Their rule eventually deteriorated into political chaos. And then came the Mongol hordes. They rode down from the northeast in the hundreds of thousands conquering all before them. They captured Baghdad in 1258 and ruled as tyrants laying waste to the land, people, and culture for nearly three hundred years. By the end of Mongol rule, the cities were in decline, chaos again settled across the land, and another great civilization had passed. The people turned to their rural tribal affiliations and what power remained coalesced with them there. And they were ripe once again for conquest.⁷

* A caliph is a person who exercises rule as both a secular and religious leader in one person.

Modern

Great powers rose to the north and the east, and each ebbed and flowed in exerting varying degrees of dominance over a region that found itself ever more a turbulent frontier tossed by surges of their power. To the east, long-standing Iranian strength now flexed under the rule of the Safavid dynasty which had declared Shi'a Islam the religion of the realm. To the north, the Ottoman Turks had established an empire under the rule of Osman I and already conquered the Balkans in southeastern Europe. The Ottomans embraced the Sunni branch of Islam. The Iranians were the first to conquer the region in 1509, but their rule was short-lived when the Ottomans succeeded in capturing Baghdad in 1623. The Iranians returned in 1623, and the Ottomans again prevailed in 1638. Sunni and Shi'a groups suffered respectively under the alternating rule of Iranians and Ottomans. But after 1638, the region remained part of the Ottoman Empire until its disappearance after World War I.⁸

Under Ottoman rule, the territory was governed as three imperial provinces established around the towns of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Most of the population was sedentary, semi-sedentary farmers or nomadic herders, and tribal ties were strong. There was initially little in the way of urban or provincial loyalties. Over time, however, such ties began to build as the provincial capitals acquired ever-greater economic and political power. The province of Mosul had the greatest Sunni population and was most integrated into the administration of the Ottoman rulers. Baghdad was the larger city, more cosmopolitan, and yet more clearly at the true center of the frontier. It was, therefore, a more tolerant place embracing many divergent peoples, including a Jewish population that comprised twenty-percent of its total. The northeast reaches of both Mosul and Baghdad provinces were occupied by fervently tribal groups of Kurdish peoples, however, who staunchly maintained their parochial ways of dynastic authority and absolute tribal allegiance.⁹

The province of Basra was not only farthest from the center of Ottoman authority, but also had to largest percentage of Shi'a Muslims. These Shi'a were principally settled farmers, pastoralists or marsh-dwellers. The unique culture of the Shi'a marsh-dwellers focused on the staple crops of rice and millet. Date palms and cereals were also important to their economy, and oxen, cows, and water buffalo were to be found among the peoples

of the marshes. This Shi'a population has always held close ties to the peoples of Iran, and some saw them as Iranians living in Basra Province of the empire. However, the elite families of the region, especially those in key positions of wealth and power, were Sunni Muslims.¹⁰

Over time, there developed a growing sense of Arab nationalism throughout the region. This coupled with the shared history of the three provinces as sitting upon the historic lands of Mesopotamia, and the establishment of an Ottoman army corps headquarters in Baghdad, began to evoke a swell of nationalistic feeling among the people along the course of the Tigris and Euphrates. Tribalism remained dominant in rural areas, however, especially among the Kurds. Conditions were already set, however, for the emergence of an Iraqi state, and its birth awaited only the proper catalyst. That came in the form of British occupation forces during World War I.¹¹

Great Britain occupied the three Ottoman provinces within a month after the outbreak of the First World War. There was a League of Nations mandate after the war for British administration of the three provinces now referred to collectively as Iraq. The name had been loosely applied at various times through history to refer to regions along the fertile traces of the Tigris and Euphrates. After 1918 it was the British administered territory of Iraq, and after winning independence in 1932, it became the Kingdom of Iraq. A republic was declared in 1958, and since the Republic of Iraq has been ruled primarily by a series of military strongmen. Saddam Hussein is the latest, but most ruthless, in this line.¹²

Saddam was born April 28, 1937 near the town of Tikrit on the Tigris River. He moved to Baghdad at the age of 17, and became an active member of the Ba'th Party when he was 20 and was soon exiled for his part in an abortive coup attempt. He returned in 1963, was subsequently imprisoned for two years, and then escaped to play a key role in the successful Ba'th coup in 1968. He quickly rose to the second most powerful man in the party behind the president, Ahmad Hasan Bakr. Saddam built his reputation as the one who could outmaneuver and, when necessary, ruthlessly eliminate, political opposition. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq suffered a war with Iran from 1980 through 1988, and then invaded Kuwait in August 1990 which led to war with the United States and its coalition partners that was brought to a speedy conclusion in February 1991.¹³

Recent

Iraq's failure to comply with the peace terms that ended the Gulf War, most particularly in not granting access to UN weapons inspectors, has resulted in years of painful economic sanctions. Moreover, Iraqi actions against its Kurdish minorities in the north, and Shi'a Muslims in the southeast, have caused the imposition of northern and southern no-fly zones enforced by British and American attack aircraft.¹⁴

Indeed, after Iraq's defeat by the U.S. lead coalition, it seemed the regime of Saddam Hussein might be vulnerable to dissident action inside Iraq. Accordingly, there were a series of uprisings in both the Kurdish north and among Shi'a populations in the southeast. The clashes that resulted were devastating for those Iraqis who took part, and served to reestablish Saddam's stranglehold on power.

In the north, Kurdish forces rose in revolt against the Baghdad regime in March 1991. They were eager to expulse their Iraqi oppressors and to get vengeance for the atrocities inflicted on them during Iraq's iniquitous 1987-1989 Anfal campaign. Then, towns had suffered chemical attacks from Saddam's forces and fell in pitiful scenes of bloated, poisoned Kurdish bodies, many of them non-combatant women and children.* Now, the Kurds rose in a fury and met a good deal of initial success, capturing several key settlements within a few weeks, including the towns of Aqra, Arbil, Dahuk, Ranya, Sulemaniye, and Kirkuk. Iraqi forces responded with ghastly brutality, however, and though the Kurds fought bravely, they suffered terrible losses. Kirkuk and other centers of rebel control soon fell to Saddam's vicious offensive, programs of ethnic cleansing were begun, and hundreds of thousands Kurdish refugees were fleeing the terror. Kurdish resistance waned.¹⁵

At the same time the Kurds rose in revolt, a number of Iraqis living in and around the southeastern Shi'a communities of al Amara, Basra, Karbala, Najaf, and Nasiriyya rose up in opposition to the Ba'th regime as well. Support came from dissident organizations within both Iraq and Iran, and much valiant fighting took place. Nonetheless, Hussein employed his Republican Guard divisions with awful effectiveness, crushing the uprisings in just two brutal weeks. Untold thousands of

* Estimated results of Saddam's Anfal campaign against the Kurds:

- 4,500 villages destroyed
- Up to 200,000 Kurds killed
- Unknown numbers deported to detention camps
- Perhaps a million refugees set in motion

Shi'a people were killed and many hundreds, if not thousands more suffered merciless torture and ultimate death in Iraqi prisons. Tens of thousands of others poured into Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran as terror stricken refugees. Saddam instituted horrendous repressive measures in an effort to insure his absolute dominance over this segment of the Iraqi populace. These included massive engineering efforts to drain the marshes that had provided sustenance to a large portion of the Shi'a population of the region who were known as "Marsh Arabs." This harsh action by the Iraqi government obliterated an entire way of life from the earth, substantially changed a unique culture forever, and reduced an entire people to a state of destitution and despair.¹⁶

It is important to note, that a great deal of bitterness remains among many in both the northern Kurdish and southeastern Shi'a regions over the failure of the United States to come to the aid of dissident groups in their uprisings against the Hussein regime. There are contentions of promises made and not kept, and encouragement to take actions that resulted only in debacle for those who responded, their families, and communities. These groups will continue to question U.S. sincerity and motive until those qualities are proven unmistakably by some future event.

CULTURE:¹⁷

Population. 23,331,985

Ethnic Groups.

- o Arab, 75%
- o Kurdish, 20%
 - Kermanji, or Northern Kurds (1,500,000)
 - Sorani, or Southern Kurds (3,200,000)
 - More than twelve tribal subgroups
 - Other (100,000)
- o Assyrian, Turkoman, and other, 5%

Religion.

- o Muslim, 97%
 - Shi'a, 65%
 - Sunni, 35%
- o Christian and other, 3%

Language.

- o Arabic
- o Kurdish (Nine different languages, some with numerous distinct dialects)
- o Assyrian (Syriac)
- o Armenian
- o English (most widely spoken foreign language)

The borders of Iraq describe an area peopled principally by ethnic Arabs. This has not always been the case, however. Some of the earliest known inhabitants in the region are thought to have been peoples of Turkish and Iranian origin, and included the renowned Mesopotamian civilizations of Sumer, Babylonia, and Assyria. Throughout the history of this culturally rich land, there have been population fluctuations, migrations, and conquests. Among the very oldest tribal groupings known in the region are the Kurdish populations living in the northern mountainous reaches of the country.

The Kurds are not one distinct group of people, but rather groupings of family-centered tribal cultures that traditionally practiced subsistence agriculture and nomadic sheep and goat tending. They were also likely the first on earth to develop beer and wine. There are twelve distinct Kurdish cultural groups distinguished by their different languages. Nine of these are found within the boundaries of Iraq. In recent decades nearly all have settled into towns and villages. Many provide a pool of labor for various enterprises in northern Iraq including the oil industry, while others tend crops and livestock on small family farms. Many Kurdish men still revere life as soldiers, known in the Kurdi language as *peshmergas* ("those who face death"). They are fierce fighters, especially in the mountains. Their strongest loyalties are established by tribal bonds. Kurds are predominantly Sunni Muslims, though they are liberal in their views and women endure few of the restrictions prevalent in other Muslim cultures. Minority Kurdish groups exist within the larger Kurdish community. These include the Feyli Kurds who are Shi'as and the Yazidis, a sect of the Sorani, or Southern Kurds, who speak a different dialect and hold religious beliefs that draw from several of the world's most prominent religions. The most famous Kurd was Saladin, who lead the Muslim world against European Crusaders and retook Jerusalem 1187. Kurds are proud, fiercely independent, and have struggled for some level of autonomy for decades. As a result, they have suffered terribly at the hands of Iraqi forces.¹⁸

Another very old ethnic group is the Assyrians. These people also predate the Arabs in the region and are sometimes referred to as "the first Iraqis." They are mostly Christians and are believed to descend from the earliest Christian communities on earth. They have suffered terrible persecution, and less than 200,000 remain in Iraq today. Other minorities include the Turkomans and Armenians.

The majority of Iraq's population, over seventy-five percent, is Arab. This group traces from nomadic Bedouin tribal peoples who conquered the region under the banner of Islam in the seventh century. Most now dwell in cities and towns, while a number tend fields and livestock on traditional farms. For most, their lives are focused on their Muslim faith, but they also exist in a world of economic realities and secular pressures. The extended family takes on enormous social and political importance. Loyalty is a core value within the family, and suspicion outside it, particularly until trust and confidence are built and confirmed, is routine. Honor drives much behavior, particularly as relates to women, whose protection stands as a paramount obligation. Iraq's Arab-Muslims are broken into two distinct groups, Sunni and Shi'a. Though the Shi'a constitute the larger portion of the population, Sunnis fill the majority of the positions of prestige and power in both government and business. Saddam Hussein is from the al-Beijat clan of Sunnis. A very unique group among the Shi'as is the *Ma'dan*, or "Marsh Arabs." They inhabit a region between the lower courses of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. They live in reed houses situated on pilings, and subsist by fishing and raising buffalo. They are strongly opposed to Saddam's regime and have suffered terribly as he has sought to destroy their existence in the marshes by military attack, electrocution, and draining the marshes. It is estimated that less than 10,000 *Ma'dan* now remain.¹⁹

ECONOMY:

- Centered on oil industry
- Agriculture accounts for only 6% of GDP and industry only 13%.
- Massive expenditures for Iran-Iraq War and subsequent Gulf War with U.S. and coalition partners.
- Crippled by UN sanctions

GOVERNANCE:

- Iraq has eighteen provinces and elects representatives to a unicameral national legislative National Assembly. Representatives elected by popular vote, but body is essentially powerless
- Also a Ba'th Party Revolutionary Council that acts like a presidential cabinet, and also elects the president.
- Saddam Hussein is president and absolute totalitarian dictator. All power rests with him.

MILITARY FACTORS:

- The potential effectiveness of the Iraqi armed forces is dramatically reduced by the paranoia of the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Hussein wields Iraq's military as his greatest expression of might, but at the same time fears its very strength as a personal threat. He limits training and the opportunity for his military leaders to interact with one another for dread of their plotting against him. Punishment is swift and severe (including execution) both for incompetence as well as excessive enthusiasm and initiative. The result in the field is gross deficiencies in training, leadership, and esprit. Adequate combined arms integration is impossible and battlefield initiative is sorely lacking.²⁰
- Standing armed forces. Iraqi armed forces have expanded from 382,000 in 1995 to over 429,000 in 1999. Two year military service is compulsory, but may be waived for a fee equivalent to \$800.²¹
 - o 5 army corps and 2 Republican Guard corps
 - o 29 divisions
 - o more than 2,000 tanks (but many non-operational)
 - o less than 300 aircraft (lack of spare parts and poor maintenance)
 - o 300,000 to 375,000 men (with more than 100,000 additional reserves)
 - o See Appendix C for more detail
- Doctrine. The Iraqi armed forces draw heavily from both Soviet and British strategy and tactics. They have developed the tactics, techniques, and procedures to

maneuver while effecting coordination between the various components on the battlefield. Their ability to conduct combat operations, however, is rapidly degraded by the intensity and tempo of modern warfare. The potential for Iraqi forces to react effectively to rapidly developing battlefield scenarios is further impacted by their conservative approach to the commitment of reserve and supporting forces to battle.²²

- Tactics.
 - o Offense.²³
 - Demonstrated dependence on outdated Soviet tactics.
 - Attempt to attack with large massed formations preceded by massive artillery bombardment and spearheaded by large tank formations. Likely to see Republican Guards units at the front.
 - Limited anti-aircraft capability
 - Poor to non-existent integration of air force assets.
 - o Defense.²⁴
 - Dug in battalion positions in triangular pattern with company triangular strong points in each corner, and a ten to twelve foot high earthen berms around the perimeters.
 - Half-mile thick obstacle belt to the front with minefields, wire obstacles, and tank traps.

IRAQI CAPABILITIES:

- o Present some defense in depth
- o Potential for spirited strong-point defense
- o Probability of chemical and biological weapons

IRAQI VULNERBILITIES:

- o Morale/Fear of U.S. forces
- o Logistics and communications
- o Widespread hatred of Iraqi government
- o Empowerment of dissident ethnic groups and religious sects as well as opposition elements within Hussein's own Sunni base and Ba'th party

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Appendix A: Iraqi Terror Organizations.

IRAQI TERROR ORGANIZATIONS:

The terrorist organizations of concern in Iraq can be divided into two categories, agencies of terror that are in fact part of the Iraqi government, and non-governmental terrorist groups that operate in Iraq.

Iraqi Government Terror Agencies

The government terror agencies protect the state by providing personal protection for the Ba'th Party leadership and security for government facilities, as well as waging terror to intimidate other governmental officials, the people of Iraq, and dissident expatriates overseas.

Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) (*Mukhabarat*). Operates domestically and internationally to track down and exterminate enemies of the Iraqi regime. History of clandestine international sabotage and assassination operations. Directs the *Mujahedin-e-Khalq* (MEK) terrorist organization.²⁵

Special Security Service (Al Amn al-Khas). Provides protection for Saddam Hussein and Ba'th Party leadership, surveillance of key Iraqi officials, covert acquisition of contraband military items, and functions as Saddam's most feared organ of repression. Includes a 5,000 man strong rapid response reaction force targeted against enemies of the state (the Brigade of Amn al-Khas). Backed up by Special Republican Guard military reinforcements as required.²⁶

Special Republican Guards. A 26,000-man organization dedicated to augmenting Saddam Hussein's personal security force, guarding Saddam's properties, and providing an emergency response force to help quell domestic disturbances.²⁷

Saddam's Martyrs (*Fedayeen Saddam* [Saddam's 'Men of Sacrifice']). Paramilitary organization allegedly manned by up to 40,000 loyal fighters carefully recruited from Ba'thist areas firmly supporting Saddam. Reliable force that can be wielded against domestic opponents.²⁸

Terrorist Groups Operating in Iraq²⁹

Terrorist groups operating in Iraq are principally aligned against Iran or Israel. The Iraqi government also uses some of them at times to eliminate, intimidate, coerce, and control Iraqi citizens both within the nation's borders and abroad. However, there is no irrefutable evidence that Iraq has wielded or influenced these groups to conduct operations against the United States or American citizens.³⁰

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

- Pro-Palestinian/anti-PLO
- Headquartered in Iraq with an operational presence in Lebanon. Terrorist activities conducted throughout the Mid-East, South Asia and Europe. Past support from Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
- Split from PLO in 1974 in a radical reaction to PLO willingness to negotiate with Israel.
- Formed around the personality of Sabri al-Banna, known as Abu Nidal.
- Limited activities in recent years possibly because of health problems of its leader. Most operations conducted in Lebanon for the past decade with membership likely down to a few hundred.³¹

Ansar al-Islam, "The Partisans of Islam"

- Formerly known as the Jund al-Islam, "Soldiers of Islam."
- Declared Jihad against "demonstrations of infidelity"
- Based in mountainous regions near Iranian border
- Reports of fierce fighting against Kurdish forces in mountains surrounding city of Halabjah
- Rumored to harbor al-Qaeda and Taliban who fled Afghanistan³²

Arab Liberation Front

- Organization of Palestinian terrorists in Iraq.
- Sponsored by the Ba'th party of Saddam Hussein.
- Used for security and interrogation against Kuwaiti citizens as part of Iraqi occupation during the Gulf War.
- Also employed in overseas terrorist operations.
- Normally operate in small groups (sometimes two-man teams).³³

Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)

- Anti-Iranian dissidents
- Closely controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Service
- Employed internally against Iraqi dissident groups.³⁴

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF),

- Pro-Palestinian/Pro-PLO
- Splinter faction that is waning as a terrorist threat.
- Formed around personality of Abu Abbas in 1976 and responsible for 1985 attack on Achille Lauro cruise ship.
- Headquartered in Iraq since 1985, but Abu Abbas allowed to establish his personal residence in Gaza Strip in 1998.³⁵

al-Qaeda, "The Base (Foundation)."

- Suspicion of links between al-Qaeda and Iraqi intelligence exist. Possibility of al-Qaeda cells in Iraq, if for no other purpose than recruiting, cannot be dismissed. Membership of several Iraqis in al-Qaeda is confirmed.
- Bin Laden had been strongly critical of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and stood ready to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression. However, there are reports of meetings between at least one al-Qaeda member and an Iraqi intelligence

officer prior to the September 11th attacks in New York.

- Reported group of up to sixty al-Qaeda members operating out of the town of Biyara in northern Iraq conducting missions, including assassinations, at the behest of Saddam Hussain.
- Al-Qaeda was created by Usama bin Laden as an organization of Arabs fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
- Present goal is to force dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policy, eject westerners from Muslim lands, overthrow secular Muslim regimes, and create a pan-Islamic caliphate across the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world.
- Sworn to kill U.S. citizens and allies worldwide.
- Strong Sunni Muslim core with close ties to numerous militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations.
- Thousands of members in widely dispersed cells around the globe with a suspected presence in Iraq.³⁶

Appendix B: Iraqi Opposition Groups.

Much of Iraq's population is dissatisfied with Saddam Hussein's savagely oppressive regime. Some of these have sought strength through organized opposition groups that are working actively to bring about Saddam's overthrow through educational and political action abroad, while others are also waging partisan warfare within the boundaries of Iraq, often for the very survival of their people.

Assyrian Democratic Organization (*Ttakasta* or *Mtakasta*)

- Long-standing Assyrian political organization aligned against Iraqi oppression of cultural and human rights.
- Represent approximately one million mostly Christian Assyrians in northern Iraq.³⁷

Constitutional Monarchy Movement (CMM).

- Founded in 1992 and based in London.
- Headed by Ahmed Chalabi, a Shi'a Muslim.
- Advocates a constitutional monarchy as way out of present political abyss.
- Proposes Sharif Ali bin AlHussein as the new king. He is a member of the last Iraqi royal line which was overthrown in 1958.³⁸

al-Dawa.

- Biggest and oldest Shi'a extremist organization.
- Responsible for assassination attempts against Sadaam Hussein and other Ba'th party officials.
- Based in southern Iraq and supported by Iran.³⁹

Iraqi National Accord (INA) .

- Guerilla force of former Iraqi military and security officers.
- Founded in 1990 under leadership of Iyad Alawi.
- Supported by Saudi Arabian, U.S., and U.K. intelligence agencies
- Infiltrated by Iraqi intelligence and suffered a defeat in 1996 with hundreds arrested and dozens executed.
- A number of INA supporters continue to carry-on throughout Iraq and feel they can play a meaningful role in toppling Saddam Hussein.⁴⁰

Iraqi National Congress (INC) .

- Founded in 1992 and based in London.
- Headed by Ahmed Chalabi, a former banker and secular Shi'a Muslim.
- Broad based coalition of major opposition groups, including:
 - Shi'a and Sunni Muslim groups (both fundamentalist and secular).
 - Kurds (both KDP and PUK organizations).
 - Former Iraqi military officers.
- Capable of fielding up to a 35,000-man Kurdish fighting force.
- BUT, suffers from cyclical internal dissidence and coalition fragmentation.
- Remains the principal focus of U.S. diplomacy and aid.⁴¹

Iraqi National Liberal Movement (INL)

- Formed in 2000 by group of Sunni Muslim exiles from Iraq.
- Seeks return of General Khazraji, former Iraqi chief of staff and commander of Iraqi forces that invaded Kuwait.
 - Defected in 1996 and now lives in exile in Denmark.
 - Capable of rallying Iraqi military against Saddam Hussein.
 - Khazraji carries some dirty laundry including alleged atrocities against Kurds in northern Iraq.
- Receiving increased U.S. attention because the group represents the possibility of a more traditional Sunni ruling elite as opposed to the unknowns of some form of Kurdish or Shi'a rule offered by other opposition organizations.⁴²

Islamic Movement of the Iraqi Kurdistan

- Guerilla force operating in northeastern Iraq under the leadership of Sheik Ali Abdel Aziz.
- Based in town of Halabja and supported by Iran.
- Suffered loss of thousands in chemical attack by Iraqi army in 1988.⁴³

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Iraq.

- Guerilla group operating in northern Iraq under the leadership of Massoud Barazani, and often referred to as Barazani Kurds.
- Supported by Iran.
- Promised arms by U.S. in 1974 that never materialized.

- Has accepted some support from Iraqi government in military campaigns against rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.⁴⁴

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) .

- Guerilla group operating in northern Iraq under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, and often referred to as Talabani Kurds.
- Supported by Iran.
- Publishes the *Kurdistan Niwe* newspaper.
- Rival group to the KDP.⁴⁵

Supreme Council (Assembly) for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI or SAIRI),

- Guerilla group operating among Shi'as in southern Iraq and under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammad Bakr al-Hakim (had close ties to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini).
- Largest opposition military force in southern Iraq.
- Fields the 10,000-man Badr Brigade militia.
- Capable of hit and run raids, but doubtful ability to conduct organized offensive or defensive operations.
- Backed by Iran with headquarters in Tehran. Strongly in tune with Iran politically and ideologically.
- Suspicious of U.S. sincerity and intentions.⁴⁶

Appendix C: Iraqi Military Strength:*

MANPOWER

Regular Army	375,000
Army Reserve Forces	650,000
Regular Navy	2,000

EQUIPMENT

Main Battle Tanks	2,200
Reconnaissance Tracks/ Light Tanks	1,300
Armored Personnel Carriers	2,400
Anti-tank missile launchers	100+
Self-Propelled Artillery	150
Towed Artillery	1,900
Multiple-Launched Rockets	200
Mortars	2,000+
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers	56
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers	400
Light Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers	1,100
Anti-aircraft Guns	6,000
Bombers	6
Fighter/Attack	130
Fighter/Interceptor	180
Reconnaissance	5
Other/Combat Trainers	157
Transport Aircraft	12
Tanker Aircraft	2
Armed Helicopters	100
Other Helicopters	275
Patrol Boats	6
Mine Vessels	3
Support Ships	2

* Extract from Anthony H. Cordesman, "If We Fight in Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf" (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 28, 2001) 3-4.

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Appendix D: Helpful Customs & Courtesies*

Alcohol--Moslem religion restricts the use of alcohol and it is prohibited by many host countries in the Middle East theater. Army officials say that in deference to the Arab hosts, alcohol will be prohibited. Pornography and sexually explicit literature is equally unacceptable in the Arab society, officials say, and is also prohibited in the theater.

Handshaking/Sitting --Shake hands whenever meeting an Arab, and when leaving him. Never sit and expose the sole of one's shoes or bottoms of feet to an Arab. It is regarded as an insult.

Conversation--Generally take the lead from what an Arab brings up in conversation, but avoid asking personal questions. Do not ask questions about the women of an Arab family.

Friendship--Arabs take friendship very seriously. The Arab concept of friendship is one of duration and intensity. Before an Arab enters into a friendship, he must find out all about a person to see how much influence one has and if the person might embarrass him. If someone misrepresents his background, not only will it affect credibility, it can seriously harm the Arab's standing and that of his family. Remember, however, that the Arab system of friendship balances favors against obligations. When favors are asked by an Arab, never give a flat "no"; it will signal a desire to end the friendship.

Touching--Touching and holding hands with members of the same sex in public is acceptable among Arabs and demonstrates friendship. Touching or kissing members of the opposite sex in public is considered to be in extremely bad taste or obscene.

Distance--Arabs stand very close to one another when talking. Westerners may find this uncomfortable, but do not back away.

Time--Do not be impatient with local people. If hurried, nothing will get done. However, late arrival for an appointment is a public insult.

Criticism--Unlike Americans, Arabs do not accept or give criticism directly. Even constructive criticism of an Arab's work or ideas in public is considered an insult. It is especially rude to contradict a person of status or a superior in rank or age. An Arab's ideas or suggestions should always be given recognition.

If criticism is required, take the Arab aside privately and gradually lead up to the subject in an indirect and very tactful manner. Arabs understand and appreciate tact because it protects public image and avoids insult.

Patronizing--Do not talk down to someone because he doesn't speak English well.

Photography--Do not take pictures of military or civilian installations or equipment, military or civilian police, or civilian airport or seaport facilities without permission of the host country. Do not photograph people at close range (particularly women) without permission.

Women--Do not stare at or strike up a conversation with Arab women in public.

* Provided by U.S. Central Command.

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"History of Damascus," Syria web page: <http://syria.arabicnet.com/damas.asp>

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⁵ Metz, *Iraq*, 15-16.

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¹⁷ Metz, *Iraq*, 69-119. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq," *CIA World Factbook*, 2001 (Washington, 2001). Department of State, "Iraq," *Country Background Notes*. Orville Boyd Jenkins, "The Kurdish Peoples," <http://endor.hsutx.edu/~obiwan/articles/kurds.html>, accessed 1 July 2002.

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²⁸ Ibid. "Iraq," *Middle East Security Report* 1, no. 9 (5 March 1997).

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